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8.1  Introduction and Historical Remarks 
The recognition of the importance of information has been one of the major 
achievements  of  economic analysis  in  the  period  since World  War  11.  Of 
course, the state of knowledge of participants in the economy was long recog- 
nized as a major determinant of the state of the economy. Indeed, the idea of 
the production function, as it was articulated by late-nineteenth-century  neo- 
classical  economists (Walras,  Stuart  Wood,  John  Bates  Clark, Wicksteed), 
came to be recognized as an expression of the technical knowledge available 
to the firm  (or to the economy, in more  aggregate  analysis). What was not 
really  analyzed was  the idea of  information  as a variable, differing among 
economic agents or over time. 
The formal analyses of economic behavior before World War I1 implied in- 
deed that information, whether about technology or about tastes, was the same 
for all participants. There was in fact a curious duality. On the one hand, every- 
one knew everything relevant. On the other hand, the price system was praised 
for requiring an economic agent to know virtually nothing about the rest of the 
economy except  as revealed through  prices. The Austrians  (Menger, Hayek) 
pursued further than most other economists the personal nature of knowledge. 
This duality  did not  lead to any  contradictions  because in a competitive 
economy both viewpoints (that of universal common information and that of 
completely private information) led to the same outcome, competitive equilib- 
rium. But it must be stressed that this equivalence is valid only under stringent 
conditions: (1) the economy is in equilibrium (in fact, the process of achieving 
equilibrium involves an exchange of information, if it is not already universal; 
the so-called stability problem,  how the economy achieves equilibrium, has 
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never achieved  a satisfactory resolution); (2)  the individuals know  what the 
commodities are (or at least are equally ignorant of their properties); (3) the 
economy is competitive; (4) there are no externalities. 
To make a completely explicit study of the role of information was not really 
possible without an adequate theory of behavior under uncertainty. To summa- 
rize inadequately, information amounts to a reduction of uncertainty (the mat- 
ter is a little more complicated than that) and hence is meaningful only in that 
context. Although probability  theory has been known for three centuries and 
even the expected-utility theory of behavior under uncertainty dates from Dan- 
iel Bernoulli’s paper of 1738 (which, among other things, contains a very good 
explanation of insurance), there were only the most sporadic attempts to give 
a systematic treatment of even such straightforward matters as portfolio choice 
(Edgeworth  1888, on  bank  reserves;  Marschak  1938, on  portfolios;  rather 
vague remarks of Irving Fisher and Frank Knight; Allais 1943, on the demand 
for cash balances). 
The vigorous revival of expected-utility theory by von Neumann and Mor- 
genstern (1947) and Savage (1954), the latter with an accompanying axiomati- 
zation of probability theory, precipitated a vigorous set of applications to eco- 
nomic uncertainty. The general formulation of uncertainty as a system of state- 
contingent commodities  (Arrow  1953; Debreu  1959, chap. 7), the systematic 
development of portfolio choice by individuals (Tobin 1958; Markowitz 1959), 
and the incorporation of portfolio theory into general equilibrium theory in the 
capital-asset-pricing  model  (Sharpe 1964; Lintner  1965; Mossin  1966) fol- 
lowed rapidly. 
These theories were based, however, on the assumption of a given public 
body of information. The uncertainties were in most models the same for all 
participants. In some it was possible for individuals to have different probabili- 
ties for the same events, but these were purely  subjective choices, not based 
on different observations or other objective and transmittable differences  in 
knowledge. 
Mathematical statistics (R. A. Fisher, Neyman and Pearson, Wald) had been 
developing as a discipline, and it was devoted precisely to the optimal use of 
information, that is, how best to use a set of  observations to modify beliefs. 
From a somewhat different point of view, communications theory (Shannon) 
was also concerned with the transmission of information. With the aid particu- 
larly of Savage’s work, the idea that economic decisions should be thought of 
as functions of information became widespread. One of the earliest effects was 
seen in Marschak’s work on organization theory (1954). He abstracted from 
conflicts of interest within the organization but emphasized differences in in- 
formation. Different members made different observations (“received different 
signals” in language derived from communications theory) and had to make 
decisions that  were complementary  with  or substitute for those to  be made 
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distribution of information might be modified by communicating some of the 
signals to other team members. 
While team theory has not developed very much, this picture of differential 
or asymmetric information  was applied during the  1960s to the operation of 
markets. Subsequent work put more emphasis on incentives. The asymmetric 
information not only existed but could be the basis for profitable actions, and 
those without the information would take protective steps. Arrow (1963) found 
differential information important in the field of medical care, both in the sup- 
ply of medical care itself and in the workings of medical insurance. (Concepts 
like “adverse selection” and “moral hazard” were already very well known in 
insurance practice but had little theoretical development.) Recognition of simi- 
lar issues in the securities markets, product quality, share-cropping,  optimal 
income taxation, and employment contracts followed very rapidly with work 
of Radner, S. Grossman, Mirrlees, Ross, Spence, and Stiglitz, among others. 
One side development was the recognition that, under asymmetric information, 
prices revealed information about the knowledge of others. To my mind, this 
particular proposition, ingenious as it is, has deflected attention from the great 
variety of ways in which information is transmitted, to put all emphasis on one. 
The formal analyses of the economics of information based on explicit use 
of probability theory and the updating of probabilities based on new informa- 
tion  have been  very fruitful in illuminating  previous  inexplicable  economic 
institutions such as share-cropping and incentive contracts. But they are only 
part of the story. One quite different insight into the role of information came 
from attempts to document and explain economic growth. The fact of techno- 
logical progress was quite evident and has been referred to casually by most 
economists at least since Adam Smith. Nevertheless, attention  to its impor- 
tance was dramatically increased by the empirical work of Solow (1957), pre- 
ceded by similar but less influential work by Tinbergen (1942) and Abramovitz 
(1956). All showed that output rose more rapidly than an index of total conven- 
tional inputs; an obvious interpretation is that information about the ability to 
transform inputs into outputs is growing over time. 
Separately, there had already been a literature, as much sociological as eco- 
nomic in origin, that studied the diffusion of technological and other informa- 
tion. The models were very  much drawn from the theory of epidemics; in- 
formed and  uninformed  individuals  met each  other at random,  and at each 
meeting there was a probability of transmission of  the information. This led to 
a logistic curve for the spread of the new knowledge, an observation that had 
already appeared in A. F.  Burns (1934). Though there was little economic ba- 
sis, somewhat more sophisticated formulations in which costs and benefits of 
communication appeared were developed by Griliches (1957) and Mansfield 
(1 968). These models have not been much developed, but they draw attention 
to two important facts about the state of information:  (1) it is not uniform in 
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information  about technology; but (2) information does migrate; its distribu- 
tion cannot be taken as given. 
Stigler (1961) introduced a new point of view into the implications of differ- 
ential information for information seeking. He postulated  information  (in his 
work, price information) that could indeed be discovered but only at a cost to 
the searcher. Stigler’s theory has been intensely developed, though in spurts, 
but has had only limited application to technical or other information  other 
than prices. 
Apart from transmission, technological progress requires of course the cre- 
ation of information that is entirely new. In the models of Solow and Tinber- 
gen, information simply appeared  exogenously. To  some extent,  it is indeed 
the by-product  of  noneconomic  forces such as scientific  curiosity. But to  a 
great  extent  the  new  information  is the result  of  deliberate inquiry,  which 
means there is a specific investment decision based on the expectation of re- 
ward. This decision may be public or private. The incentives for the creation 
of information needed examination, especially in view of the fact that informa- 
tion could only partially be made into private property. Many interesting papers 
were presented at a National Bureau of Economic Research conference (1962), 
and there has been much subsequent literature, particularly on patent races. 
It is obvious and important to note that the cost of acquiring information is a 
fixed cost with respect to production quantities, and this of course has obvious 
implications for the organization of competitive industries. 
8.2  Some Generalizations about Information 
The slippery role of information as an economic good is of deep significance 
to economic behavior,  especially in  the  relatively  information-rich  modern 
economy. It is an economic good in the traditional sense; it is valuable, and it 
is costly. But it has a peculiar algebra. Adding one ton of steel to another per- 
mits more to be done; repeating the same item of information  does not add 
anything useful. On the other hand, supplying a ton of steel to another reduces 
the steel available to the supplier; supplying information to another does not 
reduce the information available to the supplier. 
From these trivial remarks, a whole host of consequences follows, some of 
which  have  already  been  noted.  I  want  to stress  some aspects of  the  role 
of information especially relevant to the human services that are the subject of 
this conference. Some are very common knowledge; others are not so widely 
remarked in the literature. 
8.2.1  The Location of Decision: Information versus Utility 
Most of our economic theory takes a simple view of decision making; each 
entity has a natural sphere (household consumption or production decisions). 
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both) are at stake is the same who has more information about it. But in many 
cases the information about the consequences of a decision may not be at all 
in the hands of the “natural” decision maker. This is notoriously the case with 
medical care and indeed typically with professions (lawyers). Our practice in 
education is similar. The actual conduct of a school (even of a private school) 
is not in the hands of the individual parent and not even in the hands of  parents 
collectively, A university faculty, even today with its shaken confidence, con- 
siders that it is better able to determine a curriculum and the contents of partic- 
ular courses than the students or the parents. 
One principle that is clearly valuable in many situations is that of colocating 
information and decision. Responsibility can be based on knowledge. This is 
the  sterling  contribution  of  Calabresi in his  classic  analysis  of  liability  for 
accidents (1970). 
Health and education are indeed examples of asymmetric information, but 
in a way different from that posed in the usual analyses. The ordinary cases are 
those in which an individual has private information about himself or herself, 
for example, his or her capabilities or willingness to perform, and this informa- 
tion is not available to others, for example, an employer. The examples I have 
in mind here are ones where another individual may have better information. 
This viewpoint would lead to paternalism, and indeed, in spite of all ideologi- 
cal opposition, we do accept paternalism in many spheres. 
It must be emphasized that asymmetric information, even in this case, does 
not necessarily lead to shifting the locus of decision making. The individual 
less informed about his or her own well-being may  nevertheless have enough 
information to permit monitoring the choices. Further, the responsibility need 
not be all or none. The asymmetric information  I described may be equally 
applicable to complex machines, such as automobiles. The producer in general 
has much better knowledge of the performance characteristics than the buyer. 
We do not feel it necessary to remove choice from the individiual. But we do 
have a principle of product liability. The more informed party does not make 
the  decision  but  bears  a  responsibility  concomitant  with  its  superior 
knowledge. 
There are a number of modes of information  transfer that are sufficient to 
permit the less informed but concerned party to make adequate choices. One 
is experience; the repeated  use of objects from the same source may give a 
reliable measure of usefulness even to the buyer who could not begin to design 
or build an automobile. A second is reputation; this does depend on inexpen- 
sive non-market-based  transmission of information from others. A third is the 
use of signals; warranties or prices may be used to signal quality, though these 
have to be validated through experience and reputation. 
These devices permit the creation of  markets in which principals employ 
agents who are better informed than they are. Current principal-agent theory 
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of the two parties. The usual theoretical  contracts are in general much more 
complicated than those observed in practice. The published literature neglects 
the market in which principals and agents come together. 
These three modes of information transfer are market-based or at least non- 
coercive forms of information transmission to mitigate the effects of not colo- 
cating information  and decision. Another tool is government regulation. The 
government  licenses  physicians (and  lawyers),  thereby  guaranteeing some 
minimum standards. In a similar vein, we have government regulation of secu- 
rities  issues,  which  set standards for information  disclosure. These provide 
at least part of the information,  so that the decision  maker is closer to being 
adequately informed. 
8.2.2  Incentive Problems 
Obviously, when decisions are shifted from the person most concerned to 
the one most inf,rmed, there are incentive issues. As noted, much literature 
addresses incentive contracts, which have little relation to actual contract prac- 
tices. What is noteworthy  in the case of medical care is the extent to which 
professional standards rather than incentive contracts are still the main source 
of control. 
Obviously, in the medical field, as noted from the beginning, the presence 
of third-party payers has weakened the incentive to economize. This has shifted 
the incentives to the insurance carriers,  and they  are certainly  beginning  to 
accept this responsibility. But they have of course their own incentives, which 
are not those  of the patients.  It is remarkable therefore that  the system has 
worked as well as it has. 
The clearest incentive failures in medical insurance have been the increasing 
exclusion  of preexisting  conditions and the constant threat  to exclude those 
who have become ill. Any true insurance would have to take a lifetime view- 
point.  Many  apparent  ethical  dilemmas (such  as making  genetic  diagnostic 
tests) would disappear if this were understood. The problem here is a conflict 
between the possibility of acquiring information about a patient’s health, which 
may well have other useful purposes in diagnosis and treatment, and the com- 
petitive nature of the insurance market. 
8.2.3 
From the fact that information can be reused at the cost of transmission, it 
follows that there is considerable economy of  scale in the accumulation  of 
information.  Economies of scale in turn imply specialization. That is why it 
pays to have a relatively small number of individuals specialized as physicians. 
In  short, it is precisely Adam Smith’s explanation  of  specialization  that ex- 
plains why  the problem of  asymmetric information  arises in the first place. 
(Of course, there can also be specialization based on differential abilities and 
interests, analogous to comparative  advantage in international trade. For the 
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contrast  between  Smithian  and  Ricardian  specialization,  see  Houthakker 
[  19561.) 
Economies of  scale arise in another way,  which may  be called statistical 
economies. Much information is essentially statistical in character; it finds reg- 
ularities in large bodies of data. This process by definition requires large scale. 
If we are discussing the reliability of equipment or the principles of good edu- 
cation, there needs to be a large sample to get some reliability. The experience 
of  a single individual does not offer enough opportunities to get reliable re- 
sults. Hence, there is value in central data collection, and correspondingly an 
automatic degree of  specialization. 
8.2.4  Information Dissemination versus Paternalism 
The presence of  economies of  scale in information explains the mismatch 
between the location of  information and that of concerns. The colocation of 
information and decision may not accord well with the individual who under- 
goes the benefits and costs. The physician knows more than the patient, but it 
is the latter’s welfare that is at stake. 
This raises the possibility of replacing regulation or proxy decision making 
by  dissemination of  information. In the medical field, this can take a number 
of forms. (1) Instead of licensing physicians, simply inform a potential patient 
of their training and their record of accomplishment. (But who would provide 
this information?) (2) Confine the physician’s role to giving information, and 
let the decisions be made by  the patient. (3) Make it easier to get alternative 
opinions. 
8.2.5  The Inevitability of Information Diffusion 
To some extent, the spread of information will occur in any case, though its 
reliability may be in doubt. Knowledge about new medical developments and 
treatments becomes known through a variety of means, in which both personal 
contacts and media play roles. Medical decisions are made against a back- 
ground of  social knowledge, though undoubtedly very  unequally diffused. 
This is even truer of educational decisions. The professional insulation is much 
weaker, and lay boards have even more authority. 
In both cases, the word “information” may not be quite accurate. What is 
diffused is opinion, and, as we well know, this may be in some cases far from 
the most relevant observations. Cognitive biases are well known, but perhaps 
even more important is the bias toward ease of an interest in communication. 
In both fields, faddishness is not at all uncommon. 
8.2.6  Information and Organization 
The way decisions are made and information is used depends heavily upon 
the organizational environment for decisions. The medical field is in many 
ways very decentralized. The ultimate unit is the patient-physician encounter, 
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ably carried  out in classes; for the sake of continuity  and coordination, the 
classes themselves fit into larger entities, schools. This means that the knowl- 
edge is partly embodied in bureaucratic rules of procedure. These may change 
from time to time under evolving information  or opinions, but they  have to 
change in a coordinated manner. This makes each change much costlier. It also 
gives less room for learning from experience to feed back into the decisions 
about curriculum and teaching methods. 
8.3  Responsibility for Medical Decisions 
There is a whole hierarchy of decisions that have to be made to determine 
the course of  medical  practice.  Physicians  make  individual decisions about 
care of their patients, subject of course in the first place to the patients’ consent, 
but  in a context  where their  decisions are constrained  by  the prospects for 
reimbursement  and by the availability of resources to carry out the diagnoses 
and therapies. 
The conflict of incentives and information is increasingly leading to a diffu- 
sion of responsibility for medical decisions. The simple picture of the physi- 
cian making decisions for the patient has certainly become more complicated. 
Patients always had a role in choosing to seek medical advice and from whom. 
Their choices are  becoming increasingly  restricted  as medical  practice  be- 
comes more organized. The problems of cost control in an insured world are 
partly met by the increasing use of control of medical services through review 
by health maintenance organizations and insurance carriers. 
A particularly important issue in assigning responsibility for medical choice 
is the control of decisions about the provision of diagnostic facilities and hospi- 
tal facilities. These decisions are central not only because they affect an im- 
portant area of costs directly but also because they indirectly limit the possibil- 
ities  for  medical  procedures.  To  exercise  control  over  facility  decisions 
requires knowing not only the technological usefulness of the facilities but also 
the alternative sources of supply  in the relevant marketplace.  The forces of 
competition, which  might otherwise serve as a control, are dulled by  third- 
party reimbursement  and may be made less effective by  competition among 
insurance carriers. There seems to be no major informational  reason  why a 
central authority cannot set limits (for example, by preventing reimbursement 
of unnecessary overhead costs), but since such an attempt was made to regulate 
the introduction  of CAT scanners, my  impression  is that there has been  no 
effective control. 
8.4  Responsibility for Educational Decisions 
As already suggested, education differs from medicine in its more strongly 
organized form, although  modern  developments in  the structure of  medical 
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tially a public good; because of economies of scale in coordination, any deci- 
sion on education cannot be finely differentiated according to the individual. 
Education  may also differ from medicine  in that the degree of  knowledge 
behind it is less. It is harder to understand social processes, in which genuine 
experimentation is lacking, than biological processes. As a result, professional 
status, though not entirely lacking, is much less strong, and lay control is much 
less inhibited. 
Society has largely retained the premise that primary and secondary educa- 
tion is primarily a state responsibility, as to both financing and supply. Objec- 
tions have been made to both kinds of state responsibility, though more usually 
to the central role of the state in supply. The many versions of voucher schemes 
seek to achieve private competition for the supply of education. I am certainly 
no expert in these matters. Decisions have to be made as to the degree of re- 
source support, the particulars of the curriculum, the qualifications of teachers, 
and the standards to be imposed on the students. Within the framework set by 
these overall decisions, the teachers still have all the decisions inherent in run- 
ning a class. 
There are additional complications in analyzing the allocation of responsi- 
bility in education. The needs and abilities of students differ very much among 
themselves, so that the aims of the system are not as clear as they are in med- 
icine. 
As with  medicine,  the decision  making has become increasingly  compli- 
cated as the sources of finance become more varied. In particular, the state and 
even the federal government have become larger participants as compared with 
the traditional (in the United States) control by local authorities. 
By definition, the students are not a very useful set of decision makers; if 
they were, there would be no need for education. Can the parents play a role? 
Obviously, some parents  are well informed, but  many others are not, for all 
sorts of reasons, rational and otherwise. As Hirschman pointed out long ago 
(1970), there is an instability  associated  with parental influence. If a public 
school system starts deteriorating,  it is precisely the most aware and knowl- 
edgeable parents who will put their children in  private schools and therefore 
cease to influence the public schools; in his terminology, they choose “exit,” 
not “voice.” Now, “exit” is the consumer’s decision-making mode in the private 
competitive  sector.  This has  suggested to  many  that  competition  through 
voucher systems will serve the same function in  education. But Hirschman’s 
argument should give pause. 
For the voucher system to work, it would be necessary to have informed 
parents. One cannot be dogmatic without empirical evidence, but I would be 
surprised if the average parent has the time or patience or competence to digest 
the  relevant  information.  Indeed, one wonders  where  the  information  is to 
come from and in what form it should exist. Do we use test scores, themselves 
affected by the selection processes of the students? Impressions of individual 
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8.5  Decisions on Child Care 
Child care has grown up under different circumstances than education and 
probably for a mixture of reasons, good and bad. There are many systems of 
child care, some private, some public. As compared with primary and second- 
ary education, there is clearly less need for coordination. The sequencing of 
classes is much  less important. It would appear that the ability of parents to 
monitor the conduct of the child care activity is much greater because the activ- 
ity is much closer to everyday experience and knowledge. Most of the informa- 
tional and structural arguments for the public supply of education are absent 
in the case of  child care. Reputation and experience may suffice for adequate 
monitoring. 
It is also true that the utility of child care to parents is probably more deter- 
mined by local considerations than is the case with primary education. In par- 
ticular, questions of convenience of locality play an important role. On matters 
such as these, the parents have a natural informational  advantage. There are 
some advantages to specialization based on noninformational scale economies, 
but these operate at a level well below the smallest local government. There 
may, for example, be room for initiatives to base a school on the employees of 
a moderate- or large-size firm. But there seems no reason not to believe that 
the market will take advantage of those economies. 
Hence, there seems to be much less reason for government supply or at any 
rate for government monopoly of child care than there is for government near- 
monopoly of primary education. 
Are there grounds for government $financing? A case could easily be made 
against it. Working mothers should buy child care if and only if  the value of 
the additional  income plus whatever gain there may be in being relieved of 
child care activity covers the cost of child care plus compensation for forgone 
leisure. However, this argument is complicated by the taxes on income (and 
possible loss of other benefits) and by redistributionist  arguments that take us 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
In the absence of government financing, it is not very clear that the govern- 
ment has any advantage in regulating the quality of  child care. If the govern- 
ment does finance child care, at least to some extent, then it begins to have a 
stake in the quality of care. The most natural manifestation of this concern is 
regulation, especially in the form of setting minimum standards and possibly 
licensing personnel. 
I have tried to show how informational  considerations  play an important 
part in organizing decision making in social services. The crucial point is that 
information is frequently found in the hands of those with less personal inter- 
est. A social system works best when decision, information, and interest are 
located together. The practical problems of medical care, education, and, to a 
lesser extent, child care arise because these three variables are possessed by 
different groups. 239  Information, Responsibility, and Human Services 
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Comment  Glenn C. Loury 
Four policy areas have been the main concern of this conference: child care, 
health care, education, and long-term care. Within each area two central ques- 
tions have been explored: What are the social responsibilities for provision of 
assistance in these areas? And, how can programs be designed to deal with 
implementation problems likely to arise when trying to meet these social re- 
sponsibilities? Kenneth Arrow’s paper addresses these matters at a conceptual 
level by considering the role that limited information plays in helping econo- 
mists distinguish individual from social responsibilities, and in thinking about 
the issue of program design. 
There are three perspectives from which to view these questions. One con- 
cerns how individuals perceive risks and take decisions in the presence of un- 
certainty and/or ignorance. Another relates to contracting between private par- 
ties and the functioning of markets in the face of informational asymmetries. 
The third perspective considers the functioning of government regulatory and 
service-providing institutions under conditions of imperfect information. All 
three perspectives are involved when  asking about the what and the how of 
social policy. 
One way to look at the issue of individual versus social responsibility, natu- 
ral for an economist, is through the “market failure” paradigm. There one pos- 
its an idealized world of complete markets, on which every commodity can be 
traded, at every date and under every contingency, through costlessly enforced 
contracts under competitive conditions. Under such ideal circumstances pri- 
vate contracting and the individual pursuit of self-interest lead to efficient re- 
sources allocation. Under this paradigm the presumption is that social respon- 
sibilities (beyond  the  simple redistribution  of  income)  arise only  when  the 
efficiency of private contracting cannot be presumed. To  the extent that real- 
world trading possibilities depart from the idealization, one identifies a market 
failure; it is to remedy such a breakdown that the people, through their govern- 
ments, undertake social actions of various kinds. 
Information figures importantly in this paradigm. For example, the fact that 
a buyer of goods and services may not be as well informed as the seller about 
the quality of what is being sold leads to market failure when it is impossible 
to write and enforce contracts contingent on the resolution of this qualitative 
uncertainty.  Insurance  markets  and  markets  for  professional  services  are 
plagued by this problem. Thus, the social provision of insurance and the public 
regulation  or  certification  of  professional  competencies  are  collective  re- 
sponses that can be rationalized  as necessary  in the face of  the inadequacy 
of markets. 
Yet  this  market failure paradigm  is not totally adequate for two reasons. 
First, people need not be competent to define and effectively pursue their self- 
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interest. If they are not, even in the absence of market failure, reliance on indi- 
vidual responsibility alone may not be appropriate. Second, the institutions of 
government  are not exempt from the same performance failures that plague 
markets  under conditions of  limited  information. The possibility  of govern- 
ment failure militates against the presumption that matters will necessarily be 
improved when social responsibility is assumed in areas where markets func- 
tion imperfectly. The difficulty of making large, bureaucratic organizations re- 
sponsive to the interests and needs of their clients, and the susceptibility  of 
public agencies to political influence by  interested parties,  illustrate some of 
the possible pitfalls. 
It is for these reasons that I stress the three distinct perspectives  mentioned 
earlier-individuals’  (possibly “irrational”) behavior, market functioning, and 
government functioning. I do not believe that there exists any neat theoretical 
scheme that provides a general answer to the question of what (if any) human 
services should be provided via social policy. That question inescapably raises 
philosophical and ethical issues; it also involves matters of culture and politics. 
It is probable that different societies, equal in economic resources and in the 
development of market institutions, will and should answer that question dif- 
ferently. 
To illustrate, a central theme arising in all four policy areas and raised in 
Arrow’s paper is the matter of paternalism-the  coerced substitution of a col- 
lective or expert judgment for the individual’s assessment of his or her self- 
interest. Use of state power to affect such coercion is practiced to some degree 
in all four policy areas-education,  child care, long-term care, and health care. 
Some limitation  of  information  or knowledge on the part of  the  individual 
subjected to paternalistic governance-her  lack of understanding  about how 
best to socialize her children, for example-is  the primary rationale for this 
extraordinary  usurpation  of individual  autonomy. Yet  paternalism  always in- 
volves  values as well  as information.  Education  is not just the provision  of 
facts; it is also the transmission of a set of convictions about  how one should 
look at the world. This distinction between values and facts is inherently politi- 
cal. It inevitably involves social judgments, collectively enforced. It is not sub- 
sumed in the distinction familiar from decision theory between an agent’s as- 
sessment of probabilities  and his valuation of outcomes (see, e.g., Savage, 
Foundation of  Statistics). It is important to realize, to take one case in point, 
that behind the conviction that broad benefits to ghetto children will follow 
from the universal provision  of  child care lies the  social judgment that the 
values transmitted  to children  within institutionalized  settings are preferable 
to those likely to be communicated to the child by its parent. 
More generally, Arrow’s paper calls attention to the fact that, in matters of 
human service provision, the locus of decision making, the locus of concern, 
and the locus of information need not coincide with one another. The locus of 
decision making identifies the agent governing the choice of a course of action; 
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benefits of the action; the locus of information  indicates who has the factual 
knowledge needed to select an efficient (net benefit maximizing) action. Prob- 
lems arise when these loci are not concentrated in the same party. And while 
these problems  need not  require socialized service provision, or even public 
regulation of private provision, the evocation of public authority can often be 
seen as a response to some lack of coordination between these three loci. This 
framework is attractive since it captures situations of market failure, but does 
not require a strictly economistic view of the problem of distinguishing indi- 
vidual from social responsibilities. 
A principal benefit of socialized human service provision is that it permits 
the  violation  of  individual  rationality  constraints.  The economic theory of 
mechanism design with incomplete information proceeds from the observation 
that no outcome can be implemented that is not consistent with self-interested, 
privately informed agents’ being willing to reveal what they know. Yet, if truth- 
ful revelation  results in an agent being made worse off than in the status quo 
ante, that agent would not participate in the endeavor. For example, under con- 
ditions of  adverse  selection  in  insurance  markets,  a well-known  unraveling 
phenomenon  occurs in which better risks selectively withdraw from pooled 
insurance contracts that are priced  at the cost of providing  coverage to the 
average risk. As the better risks withdraw, the pool worsens, raising costs and 
thus prices, and inducing further withdrawals. Often the only way around this 
problem is to compel participation by those who would otherwise opt out. Such 
use of the coercive power of the state is only possible when the organization 
of the insurance market, if not the actual provision of coverge, has been social- 
ized. Mandatory education laws, and vouchers for education or child care that 
cannot be augmented with private funds or that are limited to use in nonsectar- 
ian settings, can be viewed in a similar light. 
A lack of coincidence between the loci of choice, concern, and expertise is 
also evident in the class of situations associated with the principal-agent prob- 
lem. In the health care sector the interaction between patient and doctor illus- 
trates the problem.  Interests are not coincident; one party  knows his prefer- 
ences among alternative treatment strategies given their likely outcomes; the 
other party  knows better the uncertain  relation  between  treatment  strategies 
and  results.  Mechanisms of  accountability-such  as professional  licensing, 
standards of practice enforced within  a relevant community of practitioners, 
threats of ex post legal action, and experience/reputation  effects-are  imper- 
fect at best. 
Another, less obvious, instance  of the agency problem  is the relationship 
between society as a whole and the parents responsible for the care of children. 
The social interest in effective child rearing is obvious, but seldom so compel- 
ling as to override the autonomy of the family. Thus, human service provision 
to children is necessarily  mediated by  parental choice. As mentioned, to the 
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choice are inadequate, the case is strengthened for socialization of some activi- 
ties  that  complement child  development,  to ensure appropriate  investments 
are made. 
Another set of issues arises in the classical moral hazard conflict between 
the desire to provide individuals  with security and the need to provide them 
with incentives. This is a central element of the health care debate, but it is 
important  in long-term care as well. Politically, the demand for security has 
been an important motive behind the growth of welfare states in the industrial 
societies. Yet  the negative implications  of inadequate  incentive  provision  for 
social  budgets  and  health  costs  have  become  increasingly  evident.  While 
people rally for their governments to provide them with security, we do not 
observe them in the streets insisting that they be provided with the incentives 
to make economically rational  choices. Therein lies a basic dilemma in the 
political economy of service provision. 
Another moral hazard dilemma arises in the presence of socialized service 
provision,  deriving  from the  government’s  inability  to credibly threaten  to 
withhold services.  All helping relationships are troubled by the following prob- 
lem: The provider of assistance (P) wants the one in need (N) to act responsibly 
so as to minimize the need for assistance. At the same time P,  being unwilling 
to  tolerate undue suffering by  N, is compelled to provide help whenever N’s 
need becomes too great. So N can rely on the fact that, even when N has taken 
inadequate precautions  against the prospect of needing assistance, should di- 
saster occur P will come to the rescue. p’s inability to tolerate N’s  suffering 
fundamentally limits P’s ability to control N’s  behavior. This is the Samaritan’s 
dilemma. Of course this problem arises in private, consensual relationships as 
well. But it is exacerbated in the context of public provision by the political 
dynamics  that  expose  public  decision  makers  inclined  toward  a  “tough- 
minded” stance to the risks of being portrayed as mean-spirited. 
Finally I want to observe, in keeping with a prominent idea in Arrow’s paper, 
that the lack of information creates a circumstance in which learning and inno- 
vation become important. Research and development in the drugs industry and 
exploration  of the human genome are instances  of this general observation. 
Public policy-regulatory,  antitrust, research support, and patent policies, for 
example-affect  the incentives of private  agents to create  new information. 
Moreover, deep problems arise about the ways in which information should be 
exchanged and disseminated into the marketplace. The issues of “preexisting 
conditions” in medical insurance and of the identification of genetic markers 
associated with higher risks of contracting certain ailments have recently fo- 
cused public  attention  on this problem. There is also the matter of learning 
about the most effective methods of organizing and managing socialized hu- 
man service provision. Here the question of which activities are appropriately 
undertaken  at the federal level, versus at the level of state and local govern- 
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which might arise new knowledge about which methods of public provision 
are most effective, though this diversity undermines the ability to enforce mini- 
mal standards of provision across the various jurisdictions. 
Viewing the problem of how to divide responsibility for human service de- 
livery between  the private or public sectors through  the lens of information 
economics is no panacea, but  it can be extremely  helpful.  Kenneth Arrow’s 
paper should stimulate useful reflection on a wide range of issues related to 
this general problem. 
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